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COMMENTARY
A RETURN TO THE RULE OF REASON
GLENN W. McGEE*
Professors Stewart and Roberts have done an excellent job in tracing
the impact of Continental Television, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.I on var-
ious antitrust violations previously considered to be subject to the per
se rule. They are not alone, of course, in applauding the reversal of the
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.I decision. I believe the vast
majority of practitioners viewed Schwinn as a decision supported more
by judicial convenience than by logic. Trial of a rule of reason case
normally is more complex and time consuming than trial of a per se
case. The additional time and money expended in trial, however,
should yield a more just determination of the restraints at issue.
As the post-Sylvania cases cited by Professors Stewart and Roberts
demonstrate, 3 the return to the rule of reason has created some unset-
tled conditions in the practice of antitrust law. Major courtroom strug-
gles will continue to occur over characterization of a restraint as
horizontal or vertical, price or nonprice.4 As in Oreck Corp. v. Whirl-
pool Corp.5 and Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp.,6 courts undoubt-
* Senior Partner, Chadwell, Kayser, Ruggles, McGee and Hastings, Chicago, Illinois.
A.B., 1942, Brown University; LL.B., 1948, Harvard University. The Author gratefully acknowl-
edges the assistance of John E. Noel, associate, Chadwell, Kayser, Ruggles, McGee and Hastings.
B.A., Notre Dame University; J.D., Loyola University.
1. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
2. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
3. See Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1979); Golden Gate Acceptance
Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 597 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1979); Cemuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet
Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978); In re Nissan Antitrust Litigation, 577 F.2d 910 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979); Pitchford Scientific Instruments Corp. v. Pepi, Inc., 435
F. Supp. 685 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
4. Although Sylvania makes clear that a vertical nonprice restraint should be judged by the
rule of reason, a substantial body of case law indicates that a vertical price restraint, ie., resale
price maintenance, is per se illegal. See, ag., United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351
U.S. 305 (1956); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944). The impor-
tance of nonprice characterization was most recently recognized by the Supreme Court in Broad-
cast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1979).
5. 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1979).
6. 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979).
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edly will classify similar restraints differently, causing significant
differences in trial presentations and results.7
This state of confusion is exemplified in some recent cases not cited
in the Article. In Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc. I the Ninth Circuit
decided that an agreement among beer wholesalers terminating credit
advances to retailers was not a price agreement, and therefore was not
subject to scrutiny under the per se rule. Although the Supreme Court
reversed that decision, the Ninth Circuit's difficulty was generated, in
part, by the misapplication of Sylvania.
The Ninth Circuit also departed from the per se rule in ruling on an
alleged horizontal joint refusal to deal in Neeld v. National Hockey
League.9 In affirming a decision that found "reasonable" a National
Hockey League (NHL) rule, which excluded one-eyed hockey players
from the league, the court showed no concern for classifying the re-
straint as vertical or horizontal. The court suggested, after citing Sylva-
nia, that a plaintiff must establish an "arguably demonstrable
anticompetitiveness" 1° as a pre-condition to application of the per se
rule. This language suggests that the court was mixing the issue of per
se treatment of the alleged restraint with the issue of whether there
even existed an "antitrust injury" under the Brunswick test."I
Although the Neeld court attempted to downplay its decision by re-
ferring to the NHL as a self-regulated industry, the Fifth Circuit made
no such attempt in two reported decisions. In those cases, the Fifth
Circuit required the plaintiff to show a "minimal indicia of anticompe-
titive behavior" before application of the per se rule to allegations of
concerted refusals to deal.' 2 The court in both actions seemed to indi-
7. In the trial of a per se case, a number of viable rule of reason defenses are foreclosed to
defendants. See 16 J. VON KALINoWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATIONS § 6.02[3),
at 6-100, 6-102 (1979).
8. 605 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 1925 (1980).
9. 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979).
10. Id. at 1299 n.4.
11. See Brunswick, Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). The Neeld court
could have reached the same result without discussing the per se rule by holding that Neeld's
injury was not an injury to competition at all, and therefore not subject to the antitrust laws. See,
e.g., Herrin v. L. M. Collins & Assocs., 483 F. Supp. 288 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Gross v. University of
Tenn., 448 F. Supp. 245 (W.D. Tenn. 1978), aft'd, 620 F.2d 109 (6th Cir. 1980).
12. See W. W. Blackburn v. Crumm & Forster, 611 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1980); Feminist Wo-
men's Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978), cer. denied, 444 U.S. 924
(1980).
[Vol. 58:763
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/2
COMMENTARY
cate that it was appropriate for the trial court to receive evidence of
justification and reasonableness, and thereafter decide whether the per
se rule should be applied. In Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mo-
hammad 3 the Fifth Circuit remanded the case for trial based on the
foregoing ground rules. In W. W. Blackburn v. Crum & Forster14 the
court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the
defendants. Plaintiff, an insurance agent, had claimed that he was the
victim of a group boycott, but the court classified the alleged restraint
as a vertical refusal to deal and applied the rule of reason.
Other interesting decisions in which courts have wrestled with the
effect of Sylvania include Grams v. Boss,' 5 where the court refused to
classify allegations of conspiratorial termination of an insurance agent
as per se or rule of reason while upholding the sufficiency of the com-
plaint. In Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombadier, Ltd 16 the First Circuit
applied the per se rule to an agreement between a new dealer and a
manufacturer to terminate an old dealer who became a prospective
competitor of the manufacturer. The Ninth Circuit in Las Vegas Sun,
Inc. v. Summa Cor
. 
17 rejected application of the per se rule only after
examination of the intent of the agreement.
All these cases illustrate not only that Sylvania has made antitrust
practice more complex, albeit more interesting, but also that the intro-
duction of additional threshold issues into the determination of unrea-
sonable restraints is unwise. Professors Stewart and Roberts would
require a court in adjudging vertical territorial restrictions to make a
market dominance finding before choosing the per se or rule of reason
approach. The guidelines suggested would require a court to determine
the appropriate market or submarket and the defendant's market share,
as if the court were hearing a monopoly or attempted monopoly case
under section 2 of the Sherman Act. I do not believe that such findings
would materially improve the ability of a court and the parties to do
justice to the vertical territorial claims at issue. On the other hand, the
suggested guidelines would certainly make preparation and trial of
such a case more complex.
13. 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
14. 611 F,2d 102 (5th Cir. 1980).
15. [1980-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,410 (Wis.).
16. 605 F.2d I (Ist Cir. 1979).
17, 610 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1979).
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Ever since its promulgation in the Standard Oil Co. v. United States'8
and United States v. American Tobacco Co. 19 cases, the rule of reason
has served the judiciary, as well as the Nation's economy, more than
adequately by providing a flexible, yet realistic legal standard within
which the country as a whole has been able to grow and prosper.
Standing alone, the rule may not provide the precision of other legal
standards. Nevertheless, the rule should not be dissected to a point
where its interpretation is more complex than useful, any more than it
should have been ravaged in Schwinn by the Warren Court's zeal for
per se oversimplification. This Author, at least, would favor a complete
return to the thorough rule of reason analysis for all manufacturer-dis-
tributor dealer relationships that existed before the unfortunate
Schwinn decision.
18. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
19. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
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